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Consent is understood differently by various disciplines and professions, and also 
in various theoretical models.i We review the advantages and limitations of 
theories about real consent, constructed consent, functionalist, and critical 
consent, and postmodern choice. This article shows how analysing theories can 
clarify practical knowledge about advantages and problems in obtaining consent, 
to assist everyday practice and research 
 
Real consent 
Positivism works in clear factual concepts defined through dichotomies: 
informed/ignorant, competent/incompetent, free choice/coercion. Medicine, 
psychology, analytical philosophyii iii and lawiv v tend to assume positivist 
concepts of consent. Appropriate information for informed consent, including 
percentage risks, is treated almost as a “thing” which doctors give to patients. It is 
assessed by checking how patients recall and recount standard details.  
 
  Positivist surveys dominate research about consent, though they mainly measure 
information given. The essence of consent, patients’ thoughts, feelings and values 
as they evaluate information and make and express their decision is far harder to 
observe or record, and too subjective and elusive to count as hard data. Problems 
in real consent are attributed to patients’ and doctors’ limited knowledge and 
communication skills, and are addressed by efforts to improve knowledge and 
skill. Social pressures, and great anxiety and distress are assumed to inhibit 
patients’ ability to make independent, rational choices, and so should be reduced 
or avoided if possible. 
   
  Positivist respect for informed consent brings important benefits. It encourages 
health professionals to be accountable, and to know and explain clearly what they 
plan to do, and why. Basic information standards are agreed (see boxes 1-4), and 
are achieved partly through research, audit and professional education which also 
improve health care. Respect for patients’ consent/refusal expresses precious 
ideals of respect for their physical and mental integrity. It defends them from 
unwanted interventions, and from deception or coercion during treatment and 
research. Yet positivist theories set such high standards that many people are 
classified as too ignorant, dependent or emotional to be competent. In an all-or-
nothing approach, consent is seldom discussed in relation to good practice with 
supposed “incompetents”.vi Sharp dichotomies are unhelpful when assessing 
borderline cases, though these are in greatest need of helpful theories of consent 
and competence. Real consent is unrealistic for many ordinary people, so that 
clinicians and researchers feel cynical, irritated or despondent about consent. 
 
Constructed consent 
From a range of social construction theories we review a few ways of 
understanding consent.  Modern ideas of consent only began in the late 
seventeenth century and are used in varying and contradictory ways, sometimes 
by the same person unwittingly using differently theories. The two main 
components of modern consent are understanding and voluntariness. These 
originate from seventeenth century religious belief that the intellect and the will 
are the two things that make us human. Thus theories of consent are based on 
personal and social beliefs about human nature. Consent is integral to modern 
democracy, also born at that time, as the idea that we have enough understanding 
and will to withdraw consent from inadequate rulers. Theologians argued then 
about whether the intellect or the will was more important for obtaining 
redemption, and about the exact relationship between them. Consent was seen 
largely an act of the will. 
   
  Some modern interpretations of consent emphasise patient understanding and, 
once that is programmed, voluntariness is simply a mouse which clicks OK. Yet 
decisions may involve a process of voluntariness or unwillingness, with complex 
desires and resistances. Desires and feelings can confuse understanding but also 
enrich it. Initially, patients often want to reject dangerous, unpleasant treatments. 
Before they can willingly consent, they have to journey from fear of the treatment 
into greater fear of the untreated condition, with growing trust in their health 
carers. Parents consenting to their baby’s heart surgery, for example, are 
bewildered but also informed by their moral emotions of fear, anguish, empathy, 
hope and courage. If they were as emotionless as real consent theories expect, 
they could not really understand or consent. Theories of how people construct 
their identity by telling and retelling accounts of their lives, such as while moving 
from fear towards hope, can explore experiences which elude standardised 
surveys. Through lengthy research interviews, ordinary people show how 
profoundly they understand and reframe concepts of altruism or autonomy, 
responsibility and risk. 
   
  Professional assessments of adequate information and competence to consent 
can similarly be seen as varying social constructs, not universal standards. Some 
doctors consider that young children are competent to consent, others say that 
patients can “never” adequately understand.6 Positivism tends to see patient’s 
abilities as fixed personal attributes. Social construction sees them partly as 
responses in relationships, influenced by the professionals’ abilities to explain, 
respect and support. Patients initially assumed to be incompetent may then be 
helped to attain understanding and resolve which they and their health carers 
regard as competent. They may decide about certain aspects of treatment, and 
share or refer other decisions; being able to decide differs from wanting to be the 
responsible decider.   
   
  In real consent, all influences tend to be seen as potentially coercive pressures, 
and autonomy as free-floating individualism. Social construction shows how, 
without numerous social and personal influences, we would have neither choices 
nor the ability to choose between them. A 14-year-old boy with cystic fibrosis 
(CF), whose brother had died of CF, was asked if he really wanted to have the 
recommended heart lung transplant. He answered, “My mother would be so sad if 
I did not have it”. Relationships can enrich as well as restrict the autonomy to 
consent.  
   
  By holding in tension individual agents and social structures, and interactions 
between them, construction theories provide a framework for case studies of 
consent as process rather than event. These range from individuals’ narratives to 
studies of surgical units. They show how patients may be influenced by their 
family and friends, memories, the media, and hospital staff who all make up a 
coherent or confusing jigsaw of knowledge. The type of unit and of treatment, 
whether elective or emergency, how complex and risky, and the time, space and 
resources available, all influence individuals’ responses. Detailed studies can 
show the extra complications in daily practice in each clinical speciality, and also 
possible ways of addressing them. 
   
  One problem in social construction theories is that of becoming so absorbed in 
variety and complexity that the essential kernel in “real” consent (boxes 1-4,  and 
respect for individual integrity) is lost. All researchers potentially face difficulties 
in justifying their selection of theories, questions and data, their interpretations, 
and the validity and generalisability of their work. These difficulties are 
especially obvious and central in case study research. Because it collects vast 
amounts of data, a further problem is its unpopularity with clinicians who prefer 
clear, easily applied research conclusions.  
 
Functionalist consent  
This is a polite ceremony, a token of respect that is hardly necessary because 
benign, expert doctors contribute to the smooth functioning of society; refusal and 
non-compliance are irrational. Consent is, however, a convenient means of 
transferring responsibility for risk from the clinician or researcher to the informed 
patient, thus enabling treatment and research to proceed without serious risk of 
costly litigation. English courts usually support the doctors in disputes about 
consent,vii and psychiatrists can advise in cases of seemingly irrational refusal of 
minors.viii To some extent, most people are partly functionalists, in needing to be 
members of a coherent society with some consensus on stable, useful knowledge. 
Although many doctors would not explicitly support extreme functionalism, in 
busy wards, clinics and surgeries consent tends to be treated as a simple or 
tedious formality.    
 
Critical theory  
The opposite view sees consent as a necessary protection for patients against 
useless, harmful and unwanted interventions, an occasion when doctors have to 
be accountable, and an essential constraint onthe most powerful profession.ix 
Informed consent is not regarded as simply one-way medical information-giving, 
but as an exchange of knowledge between doctor and patient so that together they 
can make more informed decisions.  
 
Postmodern choice   
In postmodern societies, people generally have moved from being producers in 
factories, farms or mines, to being consumers whose highest value is choice. 
Theories of critical and real consent, mindful of the serious political and legal 
history of rights, respect for personal integrity and, if necessary, defence against 
atrocity,12 appear to shrivel into the choice of trivial pick ‘n mix options. 
Significantly, the British government’s Patients Charter does not give legal 
entitlements but quality checklists, treating citizens as consumers. Postmodernism 
analyses various forms of consumption,x amply illustrated by health care 
examples. The identity seeker looks for a face-lift, a sex change or a designer 
baby. Even people having mundane treatment, who do or do not make it their 
main topic of conversation, thereby shape their identity. The Which? consumer 
studies expert advice and calculates the best buy treatment. Political consumers 
campaign for ethical care and fair rationing; green consumers are keen on keeping 
fit and on alternatives to products derived from animal experiments. Consumers 
as explorers go in for the exotic, maybe experimental treatments or New Age 
ones. Hedonists consume for pleasure, glamour and attention, and feature in 
BUPA advertisements and health farms. 
   
  All this may seem a travesty of real consent and serious medicine. Yet 
postmodernism contributes important insights. Social and economic forces ensure 
that everyone in wealthy societies is a consumer. We expect to be offered choices 
- of groceries, shoes, radio channels or holidays - and do not suddenly change on 
becoming ill or injured. Doctors are among the leading purveyors of choices from 
before the cradle to the grave: prenatal screening; childbirth analgesia; growth 
treatments; prostate surgery or watchful waiting; organ transplant or acceptance 
of death. Much treatment is not for serious disease, but for convenience, such as 
to hasten recovery from minor illness. Even consent to major surgery, like  
hysterectomy or spinal fusion, may be influenced more by personal preferences 
than by clinical judgement. Doctors also expand notions of choice into areas once 
thought to be immutable, for example by altering bodies through surgery, minds 
through drugs, and promising to alter identities through gene therapy. There are 
curious contradictions between seemingly momentous or trivial choices. Are 
termination for fetal abnormality, or prescribing Ritalin to a difficult child, 
sensible routines? Or are they part of great transformations in our understandings 
of human nature, relationships and obligations? Although appearing to expand 
choice, do they close other options and ways of living and  relating, and impose a 
tyranny of choice? Choice can be more onerous when people are uncertain how to 
choose among values and rules for choice making. 
 
Choosing among theories  
Consent is a strong concept in being so versatile and durable, but is vulnerable to 
conflicting interpretations and rejection as a worthless ideal. Real and critical 
consent remind practitioners and researchers about standards which protect them 
and their patients; these are at times too high to achieve but endure as standards to 
aim for. Functionalist consent reflects common medical practice if not medical 
values. Social construction shows how consent is a process, perceived, 
experienced and shaped through interactions between individuals and their social 
contexts. Postmodernism provides revealing descriptions of current 
contradictions and confusions in consent, which is usually assumed to epitomise 
rational and moral certainties. Consent is too complex to be understood fully in 
any one theoretical model.  
 
  
 
Box 1.  Informed consent involves knowing about:xi 
the nature and purpose of the intervention 
intended effects, and side effects 
risks, harms and hoped-for benefits 
any reasonable alternatives  
 
 
Box 2.   Voluntary consent involves:xii 
freedom from “force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching or other ulterior 
form of constraint or coercion” 
knowing about the right to refuse or withdraw, without prejudicing further 
health care,  
the right to ask questions 
and to negotiate aspects of treatment 
coerced perhaps by disease, but not by other people.  
 
 
 
Box 3.  Consent to research involves knowing about:  
the research purpose, questions, aims and methods  
relevant terms like “randomise” 
the treatment, if any, which the research investigates 
benefits, risks, harms or costs to research subjects 
hoped-for benefits to other groups such as future patients 
confidentiality, indemnity, sponsors, ethics approval 
the research team and a named contact. 
  (Some of these details can be explained in leaflets 
   and discussed with those who ask about them.)   
 
 
 
Box 4.  Competent consent involves the person,  
being able to make and stand by an informed, freely made decision. 
Adults can decide as they please, but a minor,  
in the opinion of the treating doctor,xiii  
must have “sufficient understanding and intelligence  
  to understand fully what is proposed” 
be “capable of making a reasonable assessment of the advantages  
  and disadvantages of the proposed treatment” 
and have “sufficient discretion ... to make  
  a wise choice in his or her own interests”.1xiv 
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